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This article develops an explanation for the emergence of metropolitan governance in the 
Amsterdam metropolitan region. A coevolutionary framework is deployed to analyze how the 
governance system developed between 1982 and 2009. Data was gathered from 43 policy docu-
ments, over 150 newspaper articles and 14 semi-structured interviews. The analysis focuses on 
the workings of selection pressures and the adaptive processes. It shows that metropolitan gov-
ernance evolves in a punctuated fashion when fitness with the environment is lost and when the 
governance system’s ability to absorb selection pressures has eroded.
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1. Introduction
Within metropolitan regions, authority is often dispersed over a variety of institu-
tions. This jurisdictional fragmentation is considered to be obstructing the effectiveness, 
efficiency, equality and democracy of metropolitan regions (e.g. Brenner, 2002; Savitch & 
Vogel, 2009; Tomàs, 2012). Consequently, one issue resurfaces continuously in scientific 
literature on metropolitan governance: what is the most effective governmental structure 
to deal with the built and socio-economic developments of a particular region? 
Over the past decades attempts to answer this question have led to considerable 
research and reporting by both academics and practitioners. This resulted in several dif-
ferent approaches to metropolitan governance, which differ for instance in the degree of 
institutionalization of cooperation (Savitch & Vogel, 2009; Tomàs, 2012). One approach 
is the institutional design approach or old regionalism (Buitelaar, Lagendijk, & Jacobs, 
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2007; Kantor, 2008; Savitch & Vogel, 2009). This approach focuses on structural reform 
to create metropolitan governments that cover the functional territory of the metropolitan 
region in a single political unit (Tomàs, 2012). The search for the perfect institutional de-
sign has also been dominant in the Netherlands (Faludi, 1994). But this Holy Grail proved 
elusive (Tetteroo, 2003), as is evidenced by the 85 policy documents that were written on 
this theme since 1965 (Witte, 2010), and the multiple failed attempts to reorganize govern-
mental organization for a given tempo-spatial development. 
In contrast to the institutional design approach, the network approach or new 
 regionalism has often been debated as an alternative approach to metropolitan governance 
(Savitch & Vogel, 2009; van der Bol, 2010; Heinelt & Zimmermann, 2011). The inter-
dependencies of actors is a central notion in the network approach (Koppenjan & Klijn, 
2004). According to this approach cooperation between municipalities is needed to deal 
with the complexity of metropolitan policy problems, as these problems can’t be solved 
in isolation. So collective decision-making should be increasingly geared towards col-
laboration between governmental levels and joint action beyond the boundaries of each 
of the existing governmental bodies (Brenner, 2002, 2003; Innes & Booher, 2003; Salet, 
2003). Moreover, this approach calls for a new pro-active metropolitan planning philoso-
phy, where both public and private actors meet in flexible arrangements to deal with the 
spatial-economic development of the region (Tomàs, 2012). Yet, the realization of joined 
action beyond the boundaries of the existing institutions has proven to be very hard be-
cause of differing perceptions, rules and objectives, a lack of decisiveness and the consid-
erable competition between existing institutions and new temporal arrangements (Hajer, 
van Tatenhove, & Laurent, 2004; Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004; van der Bol, 2010). 
While these different theoretical approaches to metropolitan governance have their 
merits, they don’t provide an explanation for the highly different metropolitan governance 
arrangements that have emerged, even within countries (Heinelt & Zimmermann, 2011, 
p. 1175–1176). This article follows e.g. Gerrits, L. M. (2011); Gual and Norgaard (2010); 
Kerr (2002); Lewin and Volberda (1999); Norgaard (1984, 1994); Room (2011); Volberda 
and Lewin (2003) and argues that a coevolutionary analysis of metropolitan governance is 
necessary to understand the emergence of metropolitan governance systems as a complex 
process of reciprocal selection. While most approaches to metropolitan governance focus 
on structures and (institutional) rules at a given single point in time, a coevolutionary 
analysis takes on a longitudinal approach to explain the evolutionary process that these 
coordination mechanisms go through (cf. Feiock, 2008; Teisman et al., 2009). Metro-
politan governance is regarded as a dynamic process, hence it is necessary to describe 
the changes over time and to explain the temporal process through which change occurs 
(Kerr, 2002). 
The research question of this article is: How can the emergence of metropoli-
tan governance be explained from a coevolutionary perspective? To answer this ques-
tion, the origin and development of the Amsterdam Metropolitan Area (Metropoolregio 
Amsterdam, MRA) has been studied. Arguably, the MRA is the most developed form 
of  metropolitan governance in the Netherlands (Haran, 2010; Janssen-Jansen, 2011; 
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Levelt & Janssen- Jansen, 2013). Its core is a voluntarily collaboration between 36 munici-
palities, two provinces and one city-regional authority (see figure 1). 
The empirical part of this research is a single in-depth case study spanning the 
period between 1982 and 2009. The first research step concerned an extensive longitu-
dinal reconstruction of events in the political and administrative realm of the MRA and 
its predecessors in the Amsterdam region. This was done through an analysis of over 
150 articles from national newspapers covering this topic between 1982 and 2009. The 
analysis focused on how events came about, which effects they generated and how they 
lead up to new events. This time-series provided the backbone for the in-depth analysis. 
The second step concerned a content analysis of the exact properties of the governance 
structure and processes during the time-series studied through the analysis of 43 policy 
papers on the MRA and its predecessors. In addition, 14 semi-structured in-depth in-
terviews were carried out with senior civil servants who were or still are involved with 
metropolitan governance in the Amsterdam region in key positions. Data from the inter-
views was used to reconstruct how variation and selection of policy options came about 
and what the motives were for making certain decisions. The interviews were recorded, 
transcribed and coded. A full list of documents and respondents is available from the 
authors. 
Figure 1. The Amsterdam Metropolitan Area and its location in the Netherlands
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The article is structured as follows. The following section discusses the theoreti-
cal approach of this research, where the use of coevolution as an analytical concept is 
explained and a coevolutionary framework developed. Empirical data is presented in the 
form of a condensed case description in Section 3. The analysis is presented in Section 4. 
Section 5 discusses the results and their implications. 
2. A Coevolutionary Framework
Coevolution was originally suggested by Ehrlich and Raven in 1964 to describe the 
simultaneous evolution of species through mutual selection pressures. As a conceptual de-
velopment of explanations of evolutionary change, it has found its way into other  domains, 
ranging from organizational theories (e.g. Hodgson, 2003) to urban planning (e.g.  Marshall, 
2009). An important contribution comes from Norgaard (1984, 1994, 1995, 2010), who 
understood that there is a reciprocal relationship between the activities of humans using 
physical systems for their material progress, whereupon physical systems change to the 
extent that humans have to respond to those changes subsequently. Over time, this creates a 
pattern of feedback loops between two (or more) mutually dependent systems. Norgaard’s 
work demonstrated that coevolution could have explanatory power outside biology in ana-
lyzing human decision-making processes, which has potential for understanding the com-
ing about of governance processes and systems (e.g. Sementelli, 2007).
Early attempts at (co-) evolutionary explanations can also be found in the realm of 
governance, e.g. Corning (1983), Daneke (1996), Kaufman (1991), and Wilson (1975). 
Kaufman’s account is perhaps the most well-known. He acknowledges that actors in the 
public domain overestimate the influence they have on the outcomes of processes. Those 
outcomes, Kaufman says, are the result of a partly random coming together of several 
factors. Since Kaufman there have been few works within this realm were evolutionary 
mechanisms were applied to analyze governance processes. We believe that coevolution 
holds explanatory power for governance processes and we will us this as our point of 
 departure (cf. Gerrits, L. M, 2008, 2011). 
The concept of coevolution features a subset of mechanisms that explain how and 
why systems, such as metropolitan governance, change or not over longer periods of 
time. The central mechanisms are variation, selection and retention (cf. Campbell, 1969), 
which form a continuous cycle. Variation involves the exploration of new forms of gover-
nance, of which some forms are then selected according to their fit with the environment 
 (Gerrits, L. M, 2008). Public decision-making is the chief instrument for selection, even 
though it is  acknowledged that not every decision leads to concrete outcomes and will 
always be intentional (Dopfer, 2005; Gerrits, L. M, 2012). The coevolutionary perspective 
on governance systems implies that the creation of variety and selection of said variety by 
taking decisions, is considered to be a part of the same feedback loop. In other words, vari-
ation and selection are not separate events but intertwined in a complex way and shape the 
freedom to act (Foster & Hölz, 2004). Retention serves to counteract the self-reinforcing 
loop between variation and selection as it involves forces that maintain certain forms and 
practices of governance (van de Ven & Poole, 1995)
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Coevolution in this research is defined as the mutual adjustment through recipro-
cal selection between the metropolitan governance system and the internal and exter-
nal systems it interacts with. These interactions, in the shape of actions and responses 
between the systems, constitute feedback loops leading to changing or stable situations 
(Gerrits, L. M, 2012, p. 78–79). There are multiple feedback loops that operate simultane-
ously. However coevolution thrives on positive feedback loops as these lead to changes 
in systems.  Feedback therefore becomes selection pressure as a response to an incentive 
leading to change (Gerrits, L. M, 2008). This poses two questions: what is being selected, 
and how is it being selected? In other words, how should coevolution be operationalized 
to understand the emergence of metropolitan governance? 
Coevolving systems are constantly subject to selection pressure. These selection 
pressures present a complex puzzle to the actors in terms of content, process and struc-
ture of the metropolitan governance system. As mentioned above, the selection process is 
steered by the actors involved through variation, selection and retention. Feedback loops 
carry information for actors which needs to be assessed, ordered and acted upon by select-
ing the appropriate strategic response (Kerr, 2002). To cope with the information from 
these selection pressures actors may deploy an existing combination of routines, goals and 
ideas. At the same time, it is necessary for them to evaluate those existing combinations 
against changing conditions in order to achieve renewed fitness with the environment. In 
this search for renewed fitness with the environment, a temporal situation is created where 
diversity in routines, ideas and goals is generated, evaluated and altered. According to van 
den Bergh and Kallis (2009), variety is in fact a combination of existing ideas from which 
novelty could emerge, i.e. the intended or accidental combination of ideas to create new 
possible pathways towards the future. As Duit and Galaz (2008) mention, both exploi-
tation (the capacity to benefit from existing forms of collective action) and exploration 
(the capacity to nurture learning and experimentation with new forms of governance) are 
 essential for the adaptive capacity of metropolitan governance systems. 
The adaptive moves will eventually lead to the selection of the immediate future 
state of the system involved, which is the metropolitan governance system in this case, to 
reach a temporal equilibrium state. At any point in time a governance system has a num-
ber of possible future states. This collection of possible future states describe a particular 
system state consisting of content (What should be achieved? I.e. policy content), process 
(How should it be achieved? I.e. degree of institutionalization) and structure (Who should 
achieve it? I.e. organization of the arrangement; number and diversity of participants). 
The collection of possible system states is defined through path-dependency, chance 
events, and through the perception of those involved, who have certain ideals and beliefs 
that shape what is perceived a desirable future of the system (Arthur, 1994; David, 1985; 
Greener, 2002; Pierson, 2000). As time progresses, a succession of system states allows 
mapping the changes (or lack thereof) in terms of content, process and structure. In table 1 
shows the operationalization of the system states in terms of content, process and structure 
as used to map the change of the system over time. We will use these items to trace the 
evolution of metropolitan governance in the Amsterdam region in the case description and 
analysis below. 
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3. Three Decades of Metropolitan Governance 
What follows is a condensed presentation of the data from the case description that 
has been developed for this study. The case has been subdivided in six time periods. Each 
period starts with a brief description of the selection pressures on the governance system. 
The attempts to adapt to these pressures by changing the configuration of the system in 
terms of content, process and structure are given in tables 2 to 7. The description starts in 
1982 and ends in 2009, when the first MRA conference was held. 
 Since 1969 the mayors and aldermen of 25 local authorities in the Amsterdam re-
gion met within the Informal Agglomeration Consultation Amsterdam (IAO) to discuss 
regional matters on a voluntary and informal basis. Usually these meetings were in a 
response to new policies of the national government or the Province of North-Holland. 
 Actual collaboration between local authorities was lacking (van der Veer, 1997). There-
fore, in 1982 the city of Amsterdam presented a detailed plan to form a new regional 
authority, which had to reduce the growing wealth disparity within the region. The IAO, 
although not pleased with the unilateral action of the city of Amsterdam, initiated a study 
on the most important regional problems. Following up on this research six models for 
collaboration were presented to tackle these regional problems. 
Some of the models were considered quite revolutionary, but were also met with 
fierce resistance from most of the participating municipalities in the IAO. Resistance also 
came from the national government who rejected any governmental reform at that time. 
It offered an alternative in the shape of a revision of the Joint Provision Act (Wet gemeen-
schappelijke regeling, Wgr), which was intended to stimulate and guide the coordination 
between the large cities and the smaller suburbs in the Netherlands. Consequently, there 
was a majority vote from the municipalities in the IAO to consolidate the existing col-
laboration and to allow some minor adjustments in anticipation of the new Joint Provision 
Act (see table 2). In December 1986 this new form of governance was founded on a pol-
icy agreement and renamed in to Regional Consultation Amsterdam (Regionaal Overleg 
 Amsterdam, ROA).
The ongoing globalization and upcoming European integration at the end of the 
1980’s, caused the main focus of the metropolitan governance to shift from national 
Table 1
The variables used to map the configuration of the metropolitan governance  
systems over time in terms of content, structure and process.
Selection Mechanisms
Content ● Goals and ambitions
● The tasks that are (formally) assigned to the governance system.
Structure ● The number and diversity of participants
● Organization of the arrangement
Process ● Decision making rules
● Type of arrangement (institutionalized or voluntary)
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spatial and wealth redistribution towards the international economic position of the re-
gions within a competitive market. The Joint Provision Act lacked the means to act on the 
spatial-economic problems of the regions, because of its voluntary character. This conclu-
sion was shared by a number of committees who had studied the socio-economic position 
of the Dutch city regions, the most prominent one being the Montijn committee. Montijn 
concluded that a revision of the institutional structure was needed and it advised on the 
creation of new governmental structures at the scale of the city region. 
The national government responded to the advices of the committees with its own 
policy document (BoN-1) in September 1990. In this document the national government 
announced that it wanted to form seven new regional governmental structures for the larg-
est city regions in the Netherlands, including the Amsterdam region. With the national 
government now supporting governmental reform the partners in the Amsterdam region 
couldn’t maintain their informal way of collaborating. Again, a research team was asked 
to search for the binding elements in the region and to formulate a comprehensive plan. 
As a first step along this path the Regional Consultation Amsterdam was renamed in to 
Regional Body Amsterdam (Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam, again: ROA) on the 30th of 
June 1992. This new form of collaboration had some major differences in comparison to 
the Regional Consultation Amsterdam (see table 3). 
The process towards a new governmental structure gained momentum after the 
 establishment of the Regional Body Amsterdam. This was particularly due to the develop-
ments in the second largest city in the Netherlands, Rotterdam. The plans of the national 
government to form a new regional authority were at first met with much reluctance in 
the Rotterdam region. It had only been five years after the abolishment of the Rijnmond 
Authority, a public authority directly elected by the people in which the region had unsuc-
cessfully tried to coordinate specific regional matters (Bordewijk, 2000). Yet, informal 
Table 2
Regional Consultation Amsterdam.
Regional Consultation Amsterdam
Content The aim of the arrangement was to look after the common interest of the region in order to 
promote a balanced development of the region. In order to do so the arrangement had the 
following tasks:
● The exchange of information on shared (spatial) problems.
● Collective research on regional affairs.
● Central point for the announcement of regional activities.
● The initiation of (spatial) projects
● Acting as a negotiating partner of the national government.
Structure The arrangement was formed by 23 municipalities. Representatives of these municipalities 
joined the plenary meetings. The agenda of the meetings were drafted by a commission of 
up to 14 representatives. In addition there were special meetings between the aldermen of 
the municipalities.
Process The collaboration was founded on the basis of a limited governance agreement. Decisions 
were made based on majority vote, however there were no additional rules tied to the deci-
sion making process. 
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talks about the future of the Rotterdam region eventually led to a new consensus among 
the regional partners on the most important regional issues. However, the plans of the na-
tional government forced the region to start thinking on an institutional structure to deal 
with these regional matters. 
In an attempt to maintain the initiative the region proposed a metropolitan authority, 
which would perform local (especially those of Rotterdam), regional and national govern-
mental tasks. This new authority had to be able to operate independently from the Province 
of South Holland and in order to avoid a conflict of power, the city of Rotterdam was to be di-
vided into several smaller independent municipalities. These plans were highly supported by 
the national government and it announced, in its third policy document (BoN-3) of February 
1993, a special law to make this new administrative authority possible (Buitelaar et al., 2007). 
However, the Ministry of Interior rejected the creation of a non-municipal or non-provincial 
authority, since this would mean that the constitution would have to be adjusted. For this rea-
son, the region agreed on the establishment of a new province on the level of the metropolitan 
region, the so-called stadsprovincie or city province.
 With the ongoing developments in the Rotterdam region, the national government 
started to raise the pressure on the Amsterdam region to follow the example of  Rotterdam. 
Hence, in June 1994 the ‘Letter of Intent City Province Amsterdam’ was signed by the 
Ministry of Interior, city of Amsterdam, Province of North Holland and ROA to establish 
a city province on January 1st, 1998 (table 4). Similar to Rotterdam, the partners in the 
 Amsterdam region agreed to let legislation determine the process towards the city prov-
ince. This decision was made under pressure of the Ministry of Interior, who wanted the 
special law for the city province to be finished early 1995 (van der Veer, 1997). 
Soon, dozens of teams of civil servants were working on this special law. In design 
and pace the process was dominated by the copying of legal texts for the Rotterdam region 
(Voigt & van Spijker, 2003). Meanwhile, the region started to study on how the city prov-
ince should be accommodated within the existing institutional fabric. It developed three 
policy documents which were meant to get the local authorities into line with one another. 
Table 3
Regional Body Amsterdam.
Regional Institute Amsterdam
Content The aim of the arrangement was to promote a balanced development of the region and to serve 
as a first step towards a more far-reaching form of collaboration. The arrangement had plan-
ning, steering and coordinating authority over: (a) Spatial planning, (b) Housing, (c) Economic 
development, (d) Transport and infrastructure, and (e) Environmental issues.
Structure The arrangement was formed by 17 municipalities (this reduction was due to the merger of 
municipalities). It had its own council with representatives of the municipalities, a management 
committee, and a chairman (the mayor of Amsterdam).
Process The collaboration was founded on the Joint Provision Act. The regional council drafted plans 
that were binding on the participating municipalities. The management committee could en-
force municipalities to implement these plans made by the regional council or if necessary a 
disputes committee could resolve the dispute. 
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Hence, controversial subjects, such as authority over the national airport and the seaport of 
Amsterdam, were postponed and consensus between the local municipalities grew (ibid.). 
Because of the considerable time pressure behind the special law, the citizens of 
 Amsterdam weren’t consulted. As such, officials didn’t recognize the growing unrest 
among Amsterdam’s citizens about the potential subdivision of the city. Early 1995 these 
officials were far more concerned with the influence of the region on the special law. The 
production of legal texts had started to dominate the process, pushing the content to the 
background as well as the freedom for different interests. The Amsterdam city council and 
its officials became worried that a powerful city council would be exchanged for a weak 
city province, because some of the region’s main assets, like the international airport and 
the port, would remain under municipal authority. Therefore, they severely criticized the 
(secret) draft versions of the legal texts with which the negotiators of Amsterdam returned 
(van der Lans, 2006). 
Eventually the city council even warned the junior minister that the city would re-
consider its participation in the city province. They also demanded the Ministry of Interior 
to submit to seven terms that were essential to the city. Not only were these terms seen 
as essential to gain support for the city province from the city council and its officials, 
but also to gain the trust from the citizens of Amsterdam. These citizens had collected 
the 25.000 signatures needed for a citizen initiated referendum on the subdivision of 
 Amsterdam, which was to be held in May 1995. The negotiators of Amsterdam believed 
that they could convince the citizens to vote in favor for the subdivision of Amsterdam, 
when held to a prospect of a strong city province. 
But of the voters a major 92,6 percent rejected the division of the city, against 
6,6 percent in favor. This result meant that the city council had to reconsider the subdivi-
sion of Amsterdam, which was one of the main prerequisites in the process towards the 
city province. Therefore, ROA decided to put the formation of the city province on hold 
for half a year. During this recess, a ROA-committee consulted politicians in the region 
and mayor Patijn of Amsterdam invited society’s representatives to his residence to voice 
Table 4
Regional Body Amsterdam under the framework law.
Regional Body Amsterdam under the framework law
Content The arrangement served as a step towards the city province. It had a wide range of tasks, 
of which some had been carried over by the municipalities, province and national govern-
ment. Overall it was a planning, steering and coordinating authority over: (a) Spatial planning, 
(b Housing, (c) Economic development, (d) Transport and infrastructure, (e) Environmental 
issues, (f) Land policy, and (g) Healthcare
Structure The administrative body was formed by 16 municipalities. It had its own council with represen-
tatives of the municipalities, a management committee, a chairman (the mayor of Amsterdam), 
and commissions responsible for the statutory tasks. 
Process The Regional Body Amsterdam became an official administrative body under the framework 
law. Municipalities were legally obliged to implement the decisions made by the regional 
council.  
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their opinion on the situation. These meetings and consultations resulted in a renewed 
consensus on the future direction of the metropolitan governance (van der Lans, 2006). 
Participants agreed that the challenges for the region in the upcoming years were of such 
a magnitude that metropolitan governance and guidance was urgently needed. They also 
agreed that the new arrangement had to be flexible and that all participants were to have 
the opportunity to appeal to a higher authority, which could control the process and en-
force decisions (ibid.) 
 During the recess the Province of North-Holland seized the opportunity to reclaim 
its position and to intervene in regional affairs. At first, this move surprised the ROA 
partners, but they decided that it was better to cooperate in order to find renewed col-
laboration. After all, there was still a chance that the national government would enforce 
the city province. With a widely accepted alternative, they might convince the Parliament 
to decide against the city province. So, the provincial governor Van Kemenade and the 
mayor of Amsterdam jointly visited the municipalities in the region to talk about the future 
of the metropolitan governance. Not only the ROA-municipalities were approached by 
Van Kemenade and Patijn. Following the criterion of flexibility, there was no fixed bound-
ary for the new governance system. 
However, the need for flexibility was hindered by ROA which had statutory tasks, 
a bounded geographical area and which was still a formal regional administrative body. 
Some ROA officials actually regarded the new flexible governance form as a competi-
tor and feared that they would lose their position. A two-track policy was adopted in 
1998 to solve this tension. One was a formal track making it possible for ROA to fulfill 
its legal obligations. The informal track involved a flexible network to solve the urgent 
(supra)-regional problems and was named Regional Collaboration Amsterdam (Regionale 
 Samenwerking Amsterdam, RSA). A Coordination Committee (CoCo), chaired by Patijn 
and Van Kemenade, was established to meet the need for synergy (table 5). 
Table 5
Regional Collaboration Amsterdam.
Regional Collaboration Amsterdam
Content The aim of the arrangement was to cooperate in a functional and tailor-made manner in the 
following areas:
● Accessibility
● Port and airport development
● The realization of the major housing task and the prevention of segregation.
● The international economic position of the region.
● Regional labor market.
● Youth support
Structure It was decided that no new governance structure would be created. These ad hoc arrange-
ments should be able to adjust itself to the given problem. This new flexible approach to 
metropolitan governance meant that there was no fixed number or composition of partici-
pants. The Coordination Committee was the core administrative body. 
Process Collaboration between the municipalities was on a voluntary basis. Meetings were informal 
and focused on cooperation, without any rules to enforce decisions. 
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During the same period the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning & the Environ-
ment (VROM) and the Ministry of Transport (V&W) were preparing new national policy 
documents, respectively the Fifth Policy Document on Spatial Planning and the National 
Infrastructure and Transport Plan. This happened in a period of economic growth and 
increasing mobility and consequent congestion. These developments led to conceptual 
changes in the spatial development policy. Previous policies focused on monocentric re-
gional agglomerations (Stadsgewesten). This focus was replaced by the concept of ‘net-
work city’ (later called urban networks), which reflected the growing belief that society 
was developing into a network society.
The cities constituting these networks were expected to collaborate and form shared 
spatial development policies to accommodate the development of the network society. 
That’s why the Coordination Commission initiated a platform in 1998 for politicians to 
share their ideas on regional spatial development. Participants were the three provinces 
(North-Holland, Flevoland and Utrecht), the cities of Amsterdam, Almere and Utrecht 
and the two official regional authorities (ROA and BRU). At the first meeting of the so-
called Muiderslot Conference participants showed each other their spatial development 
plans and discussed them. During the second meeting, at the end of 1998, it was decided 
that the different plans had to be combined into one shared regional spatial plan, which 
could then act as the region´s contribution to the Fifth Policy Document. The formation 
of this regional plan was not without its difficulties. Especially the complex mutual re-
lations between the city, the regional authority and the province of Utrecht were cause 
for conflicts. 
In preparation for the Fifth Policy Document the ministry started to assess the quali-
tative and quantitative housing needs in the urban networks. For the Amsterdam region it 
was decided, in consultation with the region, that 150.000 houses were to be built between 
2010 and 2030. Given this enormous task Amsterdam’s alderman for spatial planning Sta-
dig was asked (during the fifth conference meeting) to lead the accommodation of all these 
new houses and jobs in the region. One of his first acts as chairman was the exclusion of 
the Utrecht region, which had been playing a waiting game in the previous years. Above 
that, the platform was renamed in to North Wing Consultation (Noordvleugel Overleg) 
and chaired by Stadig and Meijdam as representative of the Province of North-Holland 
(table 6). 
During the first meeting of this new platform, the aldermen for spatial planning 
came to an agreement on the accommodation of the houses, but when the aldermen of 
transport and infrastructure joined at the second conference in November 2002, it became 
clear that the housing and job growth would place a heavy burden on the already con-
gested infrastructure. Therefore it was decided, during the third conference in September 
2003, that the majority of the houses would be built on the corridor Schiphol International 
Airport - Amsterdam – Almere, because of the close relationship between work, living 
and infrastructure on this axis. Investments in infrastructure were prioritized for the cor-
ridor and road pricing was investigated. Moreover, a Platform Accessibility North Wing 
(Platform Bereikbaarheid Noordvleugel) was founded to lobby for these infrastructure 
projects. 
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In 2004, the newly elected national government presented its own national spatial de-
velopment strategy (Nota Ruimte). In this strategy the national government recognized the 
region as a legitimate negotiating partner and as an area for coordinated inter-ministerial 
investments. The North Wing Scheme included eight large-scale projects and a total sum 
of 8 billion euros to realize them. In addition, the Nota Ruimte also announced a new 
policy document from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, called Peaks in the Delta (Pieken 
in de Delta), which was the economic agenda of the national government, aimed at seiz-
ing opportunities instead of overcoming inequalities. For the North Wing Consultation 
this was an important incentive to expand the conferences with meetings on the economic 
opportunities of the North Wing. 
The focus of the national government on the economy wasn’t without a reason. Since 
2005 alarming reports appeared on the declining competitiveness of the Randstad (a poly-
centric urban area comprising the four largest cities in the Netherlands and some smaller 
cities) compared to other European metropolises. These reports brought governmental 
restructuring back on the agenda. According to the analysis of a committee appointed by 
the minister of Interior, this declining competitiveness of the Randstad was understood to 
be caused by the jurisdictional fragmentation and complexity. It pleaded for the creation 
of a governmental authority on the scale of the Randstad. But 2007 saw a shift in Dutch 
politics. The newly elected national government considered governmental reform a waste 
of energy. However, it did agree on the conclusion of the committee that a short term 
strategy for the Randstad was needed and so the inter-ministerial scheme was up-scaled 
Table 6
North Wing Consultation.
North Wing Consultation
Content The conferences were organized to find enough space for the development of housing and 
commercial areas for the period 2010-2030, while also looking at the relationship between 
these developments and the effects on the accessibility of the region. In order to improve the 
accessibility agreements had to be reached on the development of infrastructure and public 
transportation.
Structure The first Muiderslot Conferences are attended by the three provinces North-Holland, Utrecht 
and Flevoland, the two official regional authorities BRU and ROA and the cities of  Amsterdam, 
Almere and Utrecht. The Utrecht region was eventually excluded by the alderman of spatial 
planning of Amsterdam. The North Wing Consultation was founded and chaired by  Stadig and 
Meijdam. The administrative core group, consisting of the six largest municipalities, the prov-
inces of North-Holland and Flevoland, and city-region authority, would prepare the meetings 
and agreements to be made. Those municipalities within both provinces that could contrib-
ute to the formation of a regional spatial strategy, in response to the housing needs as de-
fined by the national government and the region, were invited to join the conference meeting. 
29  Aldermen of spatial planning attended the first meeting and at the second meeting the rep-
resentatives in transport and infrastructure joined.     
Process The conference meetings are informal and participation is voluntary. Agreements should  be 
formalized in the spatial strategies of the participants. The administrative core group super-
vises the implementation of the agreements by the participants. 
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Table 7
Amsterdam Metropolitan Area.
Amsterdam Metropolitan Area (MRA)
Content The Amsterdam Metropolitan Area has to become an international competitive metropolis by 
2040. Five impulses were identified as being crucial for this ambition: (a) improving the met-
ropolitan accessibility, (b) intensification and transformation of urban areas, (c) development 
of the metropolitan landscape, (d) a focus on sustainability and the role of climate change, and 
(e) economic development. The MRA developed location specific investment strategies and 
acted as a negotiating partner of the national government.  
Structure There are 36 municipalities, 2 provinces and 1 city-regional authority that participate in the 
MRA. The metropolitan governance arrangement consists of three platforms: one on spatial 
planning, one on the accessibility of the metropolitan area and a third platform on the eco-
nomic development. These three platforms each have their own core administrative group, 
which is made up of the two provinces, the largest cities, the city-regional authority, and in 
the accessibility platform the Department of Waterways and Public Works is also involved.       
Process The conference meetings are informal and participation is voluntary. Agreements should  be 
formalized in the spatial strategies of the participants. The administrative core group super-
vises the implementation of the agreements by the participants.
to the Randstad. Consequently, the North Wing scheme had to be re-evaluated and was 
incorporated into the newly created Randstad scheme, which affected the status of the 
North Wing Consultation.
In an attempt to reestablish its position and to corroborate the growing metropolitan 
consciousness, the participants in the North Wing Consultation agreed (during the seventh 
conference in December 2007) that the Amsterdam metropolitan region had to become an 
international competitive metropolis by 2040. To support this ambition the North Wing 
was renamed in to the Amsterdam Metropolitan Area (MRA, Metropoolregio Amsterdam). 
For the MRA, five crucial ‘impulses’ were indicated during its first conference in April 
2009 (see table 7). A third platform was established to develop these impulses into policy: 
the Platform Regional Economic Structure (PRES). Together with the Accessibility Plat-
form and the Central Administration (BKG) these three platforms are responsible for the 
implementation of the five impulses. 
The establishment of the MRA and its sub-platforms, as a new but not final stage 
in metropolitan governance, concludes this case description. The analysis of the case is 
subject of the next section. 
4. Analysis
Twenty-five years of metropolitan governance in the Amsterdam region has shown 
continuous and considerable selection pressures. It is for example important to note how 
the city of Amsterdam has changed. Early 1980s, the city was relatively poor and in a 
bad condition compared to its adjacent cities, and faced economic and social decline in 
neighborhoods as the result of the suburbanization of higher and middle-income fami-
lies. Consequently, the city aimed for a city province to redistribute wealth among the 
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municipalities in the region in an attempt to reverse its fortunes. But the city grew rapidly 
in the following decades, both economic and demographically, which strengthened the 
position of the city. This change caused the balance between the city and its neighboring 
municipalities to shift. The coordination focused increasingly on the joint accommodation 
of population growth for different target groups. With Amsterdam becoming the prover-
bial engine for the region, more municipalities desired to become part of the Amsterdam 
Metropolitan Area.
The relationship between the region and the national government also proved quite 
dynamic. Most notable were the ever-changing regionalization policies as developed by 
the national government. While the policies in the early 1980’s were aimed at the improve-
ment of inter-municipal collaboration, for which the Joint Provision Act was revised, this 
same act proved counter-productive during the 1990’s. As a result, the national policy 
switched to the creation of a fourth administrative layer in the form of a city province. 
When the implementation of the city province failed, the policies soon shifted back to 
inter-municipal coordination and the delegation of tasks by the national government for 
which the Joint Provision Act was once again revised. 
Another type of dynamics can be found in the planning approaches for the region 
as deployed by the different departments of the national government. Early 1980’s, the 
region was supposed to be accommodating the suburbanization through concentrated 
urban expansion to contain urban sprawl. At the end of the 1980’s this policy shifted in 
order to stop the inner-city decline, and fostering the international economic position of 
the Netherlands became a predominant goal, with the Randstad and its international air-
port and seaport as the key features. At the end of the 1990’s, the regions were regarded 
as interconnected cores in a global network, the network cities, soon to be followed up 
with the term urban network. Inter-ministerial schemes were set up to coordinate in-
vestments in these urban networks, but much debate lasted on where an urban network 
starts and ends. This was shown in 2008 when the national government scaled-up their 
national scheme.
These examples show that the actors in the Amsterdam metropolitan region were 
under continuous pressure to change the means and ends of the metropolitan governance 
system in terms of content, structure and process. One would expect these incentives to 
lead to a continuous search process in which variation is explored and selections are made 
in order to improve the fitness with the environment, as elaborated in Section 2. However, 
if we look at the development of the metropolitan governance systems over time, they 
show a considerable capacity to absorb the pressures exerted on them by exploiting the 
existing governance arrangement. In the following section we will have a closer look at the 
trajectory of the metropolitan governance systems. 
The case description started with a metropolitan governance system that was mud-
dling through. Attempts to radically change the governance system all ended in failure. 
When the pressure on the system was severely increased by the end of the 1980s, by the 
city of Amsterdam and the national government, the system had to adapt by letting go of 
the voluntary collaboration. Instead a regional authority with binding terms of reference 
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was formed. Although almost all members seemed to agree that this was a first step to-
wards a more intensive form of collaboration, the region tried to keep control over their 
own planning, structure and goals. This attempt was reinforced by the bottom-up ap-
proach of the national government. But the system was soon pushed in a trajectory to-
wards a city province when the Rotterdam region opted for a far-reaching proposal in 
its attempt to stay in control over the process. The coevolutionary dynamics between the 
national government and the Rotterdam region resulted in such a pressure on the Amster-
dam region that they had to let go their own open planning and goals and were forced in 
a more reactive role. 
What started out as an open and dynamic process soon turned in to a process domi-
nated by legislation. No longer were the questions asked of what the new administrative 
authority should achieve and who should do that. Instead, the question of how this admin-
istrative authority could be achieved became dominant. With the time pressure on the ne-
gotiators increasing, variation diminished resulting in less creativity, innovation and room 
for different opinions. This resulted in an ever-diminishing support for the city province, 
but the momentum is carried forward since very few people dare to challenge the band-
wagon. The system was also unaware of the growing unrest among the citizens and their 
potential influence on the process. The outcome of the referendum provided a window 
of opportunity for most people to withdraw their support in public. In other words, the 
massive vote of the citizens of Amsterdam against the subdivision of their city pushed the 
system out of its balance; since the system’s adaptive capacity was diminished it could no 
longer cope with the internal and external pressures. In terms of punctuated equilibrium 
this period is marked by an alternation between inertia and swift change during which the 
system can create substantially different configurations.
The change to the two-track policy shows that a system that has undergone a 
transition carries the traces of its past state in to the new state as the Regional Body 
Amsterdam was still a formal administrative body. It also highlights the self-organizing 
capacity of the region to create this new arrangement with a flexible structure without 
external control. Interestingly, we can once again observe, that this capacity is practiced 
by the region to stay in control over its own future, e.g. to resist externally induced 
change towards the city province, by creating an alternative arrangement and by forging 
‘new’ alliances (Province of North-Holland). However, the flexible governance system 
proved to be well developed in terms of exploration, but was lacking the capacity to 
transform gains from exploration into objects of exploitation (cf. Duit & Galaz, 2008). 
This made the system incapable of developing a joint spatial development strategy, 
thereby risking the loss of national government funding and authority over the develop-
ment of the region. 
This pressure forced the region to hasten its decisions in terms of content, process 
and structure of the metropolitan governance system. In terms of content it was decided 
to focus on the housing task. As of structure the Utrecht region was excluded from the 
meetings and only those municipalities that could contribute to the regional spatial strat-
egy were invited. Although the meetings stayed informal and voluntary, implementation 
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was supervised by the administrative core group. This shows that selection pressures can 
also have enabling principles as it had a positive effect on the North Wing Consultation to 
develop itself in to what would become the Amsterdam Metropolitan Area or MRA. So 
what started as an informal gathering to talk about spatial plans, eventually became the 
most important coordination platform in the region, making the Regional Collaboration 
Amsterdam and the Coordination Commission redundant. Hence, it can be concluded 
that the most advanced form of metropolitan coordination in the Netherlands was never 
planned as such, but is the unforeseen outcome of the coevolutionary process between the 
governance system and its environment.
Overall, the metropolitan governance arrangements proved to have remarkable self- 
organizing capacities when under internal and external pressure. We can see that both 
strategies of exploitation and exploration were used in response to selection pressures. In 
terms of exploitation it can be observed that the structure of the arrangements proved to 
be an important constant element. Once the relevant relationships have been selected there 
is a high degree of stability in these relationships. Only after the referendum we can see 
that alternative system boundaries were explored to regain a fit with the environment. Yet, 
it took new boundaries to stabilize the newly formed arrangement. In terms of process we 
can see initial adaptive moves by the first two arrangements in the sense that local authori-
ties delegated authority to restore stability. However, these adaptive moves proved to be 
insufficient to deal with the external pressures of the national government and the process 
towards the city-province was initiated. This pushed the system in a pattern of exploitation 
to reach the planned end-state of a city province and eventually led to the loss of its adap-
tive capacity. After the referendum a voluntary coordination mechanism proved to provide 
a better fit. The content of the arrangements seems to show the most dynamics as new 
goals and tasks are continuously being adopted and explored, with governmental funding 
being an important incentive. 
5. Conclusions
This article sets out to explain the emergence of metropolitan governance in coevo-
lutionary terms. A longitudinal coevolutionary analysis of metropolitan governance was 
developed in order to understand the emergence of metropolitan governance systems as a 
complex process of reciprocal selection.
In the case description we have presented the selection pressures exerted on the 
metropolitan governance systems in the Amsterdam region between 1982 and 2009 and 
the changes made to the configuration of the governance systems in terms of content, 
structure and process. If we consider the full 25 years covered in the analysis, it appears 
that long periods of dynamic equilibrium are punctuated by short periods of instability, 
where considerable change to the governance system is possible. We ascribe the periods 
of dynamic equilibrium to the capacity of the system to accommodate the pressures in its 
existing routines. Stability occurs when relatively little variety is accepted and/or gener-
ated, i.e.  exploitation of the existing form of collective action. Change is associated with 
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an increase of the variety that is considered, i.e. the exploration of different forms of gov-
ernance. The various forms of collaboration in the Amsterdam region are a result of this 
tension between exploration and exploitation.
The analysis shows that metropolitan governance is largely driven by this process of 
reciprocal selection in order to find a better fit with its environment, as actors are under 
continuous pressure to change the means (structure and process), and ends (content) of 
the governance system. The change, or lack thereof, is therefore a function of increas-
ing or decreasing fit between the two. The analysis showed that there is always a mix of 
exploitation and exploration, with the first being dominant in times of stasis and the latter 
during times of change. Hence, there seems to be a relationship between adaptive capacity 
and variety, i.e. that variety is created when the system has lost its adaptive capacity and 
fit with the environment. However, keeping balance between exploitation and exploration 
isn’t only difficult because of the reinforcing nature of exploitation and exploration, but 
also because of the events and developments relegated outside the span of control leaving 
the metropolitan governance system only partially in control. Hence, stable systems run 
the risk of losing their resilience in the face of external selection pressures creating variety, 
as witnessed by e.g. the referendum. Successful configurations of structure, process and 
content will therefore last as long as fitness is maintained.
This however does not imply that the governance systems have a complete lack of 
control. The actors were often capable of influencing the process. Especially remark-
able in this case were the relationship between the regions and the national government. 
Twice, the threat of externally induced change by the national government triggered 
the region’s explorative capacity in an attempt to remain in control over its own future. 
In contrast, the case also showed that potential national government funding acted as 
a trigger for the region’s capacity to transform gains from exploration into objects of 
exploitation. Here key actors played an important role in stimulating the self-organizing 
capacity of the metropolitan region and making selections in terms of content, structure 
and process. 
We have visualized the trajectory of the government arrangements in figure 2. Each 
arrangement, as described in tables 2 to 7, has been classified according to the flexibility in 
its composition (vertical axis) and the measure of hierarchy (horizontal axis). Note that the 
axis in the illustration don’t represent absolute values, but rather are an indication based 
on our own judgment. The first two arrangements (tables 2 and 3) are characterized by 
adaptive changes towards the city province in a dynamic process. Soon the selection pres-
sure on the system constrain the direction of change and possible variation (table 4). With 
the system no longer able to adapt to changing circumstances, it had to change radically 
to renew its fitness with the environment (table 5). A flexible and voluntary arrangement 
was deemed necessary, but proved to be detached from its environment because of its 
overemphasis on exploration. With selections made in terms of structure and content and 
the enabling principles of the selection pressures led to the stabilizing of the arrangement 
and further exploitation (tables 6 and 7). 
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It should be noted that the coevolutionary process described above has no fixed end-
state in the long run, even though actors make purposeful decisions about it. As shown 
it is subject to non-ergodic chance events that have a considerable influence on the evo-
lutionary trajectory. Each decision or chance event contributes to the overall course of 
the coevolutionary process, but never fully determines it. The fact that the metropolitan 
governance has survived in various forms up until the current MRA is a testimony to the 
adaptive capacity present in the systems. However, instability is a sign of a healthy system 
that has the capacity to regain fitness. This should provide consolation to those who busy 
themselves with the reorganization of metropolitan governance.
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